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Abstract
How can a decision-maker assess the potential of environmental policies when a group of ex-
perts provides divergent estimates on their effectiveness? To address this question, we propose
and analyze a variant of the well-studied α-maxmin model in decision theory. In our framework,
and consistent to the paper’s empirical focus on renewable-energy R&D investment, experts’
subjective probability distributions are allowed to be action-dependent. In addition, the deci-
sion maker constrains the sets of priors to be considered via a parsimonious measure of their
distance to a benchmark “average” distribution that grants equal weight to all experts. While
our model is formally rooted in the decision-theoretic framework of Olszewski [37], it may also
be viewed as a structured form of sensitivity analysis. We apply our framework to original
data from a recent expert elicitation survey on solar energy. The analysis suggests that more
aggressive investment in solar energy R&D is likely to yield significant dividends even, or rather
especially, after taking expert ambiguity into account.
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1 Introduction
Environmental policy makers must often come to grips with considerable uncertainty. The inher-
ent complexity of many environmental problems, combined with a lack of reliable data, impose
significant challenges for the analysis of different policy options. In such situations, guidance can
be sought by directly consulting a group of knowledgeable experts.
The field of structured expert judgment (also known as “expert elicitation”) has been developed
to add scientific rigor to the process of expert consultation. Expert elicitation derives probabilistic
input for decision problems through the quantification of experts’ subjective uncertainties (Morgan
and Henrion [31], Cooke [13], O’Hagan et al. [36]). Subjective probability distributions are derived
via transparent protocols and treated as scientific data (Cooke [13]). The employed techniques
involve recognizing and removing, as much as possible, known psychological biases in judgment
(Tversky and Kahneman [42, 43]). Consistency checks are incorporated throughout, and ques-
tionnaires are designed to elicit clear, unequivocal answers. Recognizing the value-added that it
brings to the decision making process, expert elicitation is used in a wide variety of settings and
the interested reader may consult [31, 13, 36, 44] for a comprehensive account.
Expert elicitation studies are being increasingly pursued in the assessment of environmental
policy. In the United States, they have become part of the government’s analytic toolkit (U.S.
EPA [44]) in the development of environmental regulation. Their acceptance by policy makers no
doubt reflects their growing popularity in academic circles. In the academic literature on climate
change policy, numerous expert elicitations have been performed to provide estimates of criti-
cal climate-model parameters (e.g., climate sensitivity) as well as climate-related impacts (Nord-
haus [34], Morgan et al. [32, 33], Vaughn and Spouge [46], Zickfeld et al. [49, 50]). Furthermore,
and related to the empirical focus of the present paper, a number of recent studies have applied
expert elicitation techniques to assess the potential of investment in renewable-energy R&D. Baker
et al. [6, 7], Baker and Keisler [8], Curtright et al. [14], Bosetti et al. [10] and Fiorese et al. [16]
collected and interpreted expert opinions to investigate the uncertain effects of R&D investments
on the prospect of success of carbon capture and storage, hybrid electric vehicles, cellulosic biofuels,
and solar PV technologies.
Despite its compelling features, expert elicitation often generates divergent opinions across
experts, resulting in ambiguous recommendations. To address this inconclusiveness, researchers
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typically aggregate over expert estimates in some fashion and consider the resulting weighted
average in their subsequent assessment. Indeed, there is a rich, primarily management-science,
literature that studies the many different ways such aggregations may be performed (Clemen and
Winkler [11, 12]).
Yet, we can imagine settings in which the quest for a unique probability distribution summa-
rizing expert opinion is either infeasible or undesirable. This is particularly true when the issue
on which expert opinion is sought is unprecedented and/or exceedingly complex, implying an ex-
tremely wide range of estimates. In such instances, aggregating over experts and making decisions
based on the resulting average probability distribution may lead to suboptimal policy. In environ-
mental applications, this point has been forcefully made with regard to climate change (Knutti et
al. [25], Millner et al. [30], Woodward and Bishop [47]) and ecosystem management (Ludwig et
al. [27], Vardas and Xepapadeas [45]). In such cases, the decision maker may arguably be better
off simultaneously exploring the consequences of many different weighting schemes in a systematic
fashion.
A modeling framework for addressing such situations can be found in the literature on decision
making under ambiguity.1 In contrast to the traditional Bayesian setting, in which probabilities
are assigned to events via a unique Bayesian prior, decision-theoretic models of ambiguity are
designed to address situations in which a decision maker is unable to assign precise probabilistic
structure to the problem she is trying to address. In such situations, the traditional expected
utility paradigm (based on a unique prior summarizing all problem uncertainty) fails on both
normative and descriptive grounds (Gilboa and Marinacci [21]). On normative grounds it clashes
with appealing axioms of rational choice, while from a descriptive standpoint it is often in conflict
with observed patterns of behavior.2 Given the complexity of many environmental phenomena,
it is unsurprising that models of ambiguity aversion are increasingly being employed to address
policy under conflicting expert opinion (Woodward and Bishop [47], Millner et al. [30], Asano [3],
Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas [4]).3
1See Gilboa and Marinacci [21] for a comprehensive recent survey.
2Indeed, there seems to be experimental evidence suggesting that lab subjects actually reason in a way that is
consistent to models of ambiguity aversion when confronted with inconclusive expert judgments (Baillon et al. [5]).
3An important additional concern that some authors have raised is that probabilistic estimates elicited from
experts may not always represent probabilities in the actuarial sense (see, e.g., Millner et al. [29] and Kriegler et
al. [26]). This concern seems to apply to the empirical application of this paper as well, at least in part (see Appendix
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Our contribution. In this paper we further the literature on environmental decision-making
under conflicting expert opinion. To fix ideas and prepare the ground for the paper’s empirical
exercise, let us suppose that a decision maker elicits the judgment of a set of experts on the effect
of R&D investment on the future cost of a promising green technology.4 Levels of R&D investment
affect the decision maker’s problem in two ways: (a) they alter experts’ subjective probability
distributions on the technology’s future cost and (b) they are arguments of a utility function that
measures the investment’s cost-effectiveness as a function of R&D expenditure and the resulting
technological improvement.
As experts will frequently provide divergent estimates on the potential of green R&D, the
decision maker wishes to systematically explore the implications of many different ways of weighting
their estimates. We propose a parsimonious parametric framework to facilitate this process. As
an initial benchmark, our model posits equal-weight linear aggregation over experts’ divergent
probability distributions. Subsequently, it considers enlargements of the set of possible linear
aggregation schemes by parameterizing over their maximum distance, measured via the Euclidean
norm, with respect to the benchmark equal-weight aggregation. This distance is referred to as
aggregation ambiguity and can be naturally interpreted as setting a bound on the total weight that
can be assigned to any group of experts. Guaranteeing a bound of this sort may be a normative or
operational desideratum, in the sense that it provides a check on the influence of any single group
of experts, and guards against outlier opinions. Next, our model computes the best-and worst-case
expected outcomes of a given level of R&D investment, subject to the feasible set of distributions
that is implied by assigned levels of aggregation ambiguity. Finally, the decision maker’s preferences
are captured by a convex combination of the best and worst-case expected outcomes. The weights
placed on the worst and best cases reflect her ambiguity attitude.
The above framework is a variation of the α-maxmin model that has been studied extensively
in the economic-theory literature beginning with Arrow and Hurwicz [2]. Later contributions by
Gilboa and Schmeidler [22] (whose seminal paper dealt with the pure maxmin model), Ghirardato
A1). The decision-theoretic literature has begun to address such imprecise probabilities (see, e.g., Gajdos et al. [17]
and Gajdos and Vergnaud [18]) in the context of decision making under ambiguity. Extending our framework to
account for expert imprecision would be a very interesting avenue of future research.
4Note, however, that our formal model generalizes to many alternative contexts of decision making under uncer-
tainty.
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et al. [20], and Eichberger et al. [15] provided axiomatic treatments of similar models. The model we
adopt in this paper is not a strict application of this framework. This is because its decision variables
enter the value function as arguments of both (a) a utility function measuring the technology’s payoff
as well as (b) the set of priors that the decision-maker is taking into account when performing
her best- and worst-case analysis. This latter element of action-dependent subjective beliefs is
non-standard in the formal decision-theoretic literature going back to the work of Savage [40].5
Jaffray [23] had first introduced a similar notion with an α-maxmin model based on non-additive
belief functions, while later Ghirardato [19] analyzed a model in which acts map from states to sets
of consequences.
Recently, Olszewski [37] studied the α-maxmin model in a setting in which decision makers
are called to choose between sets of lotteries, i.e., probability distributions over outcomes. This is
the α-maxmin framework that most fits our context, since levels of R&D directly affect experts’
probability distributions –and thus can be seen as defining sets of lotteries over the technology’s
future payoff. Olszewski showed that when choosing between sets of lotteries the α-maxmin rule
uniquely satisfies a set of axioms that generalize their counterparts in settings of single probability
distributions.
Our paper aims to operationalize the model axiomatized by Olszewski in an applied setting of
expert elicitation. Indeed, our work is an outgrowth of the need to develop a tractable theoretical
framework to accommodate expert opinions gathered by a recent elicitation [10]. Still, it is im-
portant to note that our framework is open to legitimate criticism. First, not everyone may agree
with our consideration of aggregation ambiguity via the Euclidean norm. Second, the axiomatic
underpinnings of the Olszewski α-maxmin model, though clear, will not, in general, be universally
accepted as a means of characterizing the “right” decision maker preferences under ambiguity.
Thus, even for researchers who espouse models of ambiguity aversion, our framework may not be
entirely satisfactory.
On a more general level, a number of scholars are skeptical of using models of ambiguity aversion
as a foundation for rational decision making. The application area of expert elicitation only serves
to heighten these concerns, as specialized researchers have developed a variety of methods in order
to arrive to a unique distribution representing expert beliefs (as discussed in the extensive survey
5Note, however, that endogenous probabilities are common in Decision Analysis and dynamic programming.
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papers by Clemen and Winkler). We do not take a strong stand on this issue, not least because
we ourselves are not philosophers of science, nor specialists in expert elicitation. Still, what we can
constructively say is that for scholars who are unconvinced by models of ambiguity aversion, our
framework may be interpreted as a kind of structured sensitivity analysis. The logic would run
along the following lines:6 It is resource-intensive and perhaps politically sensitive to determine an
optimal weighting of the experts. Thus, it is preferable to assume equal weights and then apply the
machinery of the proposed model to test the robustness of the resulting recommendations. If we
see that optimal R&D levels are highly sensitive to small changes in the model parameters, then
we can conclude that assigning equal weights to experts may lead to non-robust policy and that
more careful deliberation regarding expert weighting is called for.
The paper’s empirical section applies our model to original data from the ICARUS project
(Bosetti et al. [10]), a recent expert elicitation on the potential of European Union R&D investment
in renewable energy technologies (for more information see www.icarus-project.org). As an initial
step, we used the collected data of the ICARUS survey to construct experts’ subjective probability
distributions on the future cost of solar energy conditional on R&D investment. Subsequently,
we employed an integrated assessment model (Bosetti et al. [9]) to calculate the benefits of R&D
investment (via the future solar-electricity costs that R&D may bring about). The application of
our theoretical model to these data suggested that expert ambiguity plays an important role in
assessing the potential of solar technology. Our analysis allowed us to (cautiously) draw two policy
implications: (1) that a 100% increase of EU investment in solar technology R&D is likely to yield
significant rewards, even after taking expert ambiguity into account, (2) that a 50% increase in
investment will likely always be less preferred to either a 100% increase, or maintaining the status
quo.
Related work. There is a long and growing literature of applications of models of ambiguity
aversion to environmental economics (see [45, 3, 41, 4, 30] among others). Most of these papers
deal with different, dynamic models of ambiguity aversion, which do not have action-dependent
subjective probabilities. Moreover, with the exception of Millner et al. [30], these papers do not
engage directly with the issue of expert aggregation. Perhaps the closest parallel to our work can
be found in Woodward and Bishop [47]. There, the authors applied a much simplified version of
6We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this alternative interpretation of our work.
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our α-maxmin framework to William Nordhaus’ DICE integrated assessment model [35]. There
were two stylized “experts” in the analysis, reflecting different views on the model’s damage func-
tion parameters.7 The first expert held that damages will be relatively moderate (in line with
Nordhaus’ “base-case scenario”), while the second was much more pessimistic (in line with Nord-
haus’ “catastrophic” scenario). In this binary setting, the authors argued that a rational decision
maker would seek to maximize the worst-case payoff, in the Gilboa and Schmeidler [22] sense, and
adopt an emissions trajectory that is optimal under the catastrophic scenario. This finding was
reinforced by the possibility of learning the true damage parameters at a later stage. While the
analysis was quite simplified, the main policy implication was that it pays to follow a policy of
aggressive abatement from the outset, even if the future is not quite as catastrophic as one might
fear.
Paper outline. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses an example of our
setting to motivate the introduction of the formal model, which follows in Section 3. Section 4
applies the theoretical model to original data from the ICARUS expert elicitation survey on solar
technology and discusses possible policy implications. Section 5 provides brief concluding remarks
and directions for future research. An Appendix collects non-essential supplementary information,
as well as tables and figures not appearing in the main text.
2 Model description
Consider a set N of experts indexed by n = 1, 2, ..., N . R&D investment is denoted by a variable
r ∈ R and the technology’s cost by c ∈ C, where R and C are subsets of real numbers. To make
our framework completely consistent with the model of Olszewki [37] we assume the sets R and C
are finite. An expert n’s probability distribution of the future cost of technology given investment
r is captured by a random variable having a probability distribution function (pdf)
pin(c|r). (1)
How do we make sense of divergence in the pdfs (pi1(·|r), pi2(·|r), ..., piN (·|r)) when studying
optimal R&D investment? In the absence of data that could lend greater credibility to one expert
7In contrast to the more general setting of our paper, these uncertain parameters were exogenous to the choice of
policy.
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over another, one straightforward way would be to simply aggregate over all pdfs pin as given by
Eq. (1), so that we obtain an “aggregate” pdf p¯i, where
p¯i(·|r) =
N∑
n=1
1
N
pin(·|r). (2)
This approach inherently assumes that each and every expert is equally likely to represent reality,
and makes use of simple linear aggregation. However, this way of aggregating expert pdfs may not
always result in robust recommendations.
We thus move beyond simple averaging. In our framework each expert n’s pdf pin(c|r) is
weighted by the decision maker through a second-order probability pn. The set of admissible
second-order distributions p depends on the amount of ambiguity the decision maker is willing to
take into account when aggregating across experts, and in particular on how “far” she is prepared to
stray from equal-weight aggregation. Specifically, we consider the set of second-order distributions
P(b) over a set of N experts, parametrized by b ∈ [0, N−1N ] where
P(b) =
p ∈ <N : p ≥ 0,
N∑
n=1
pn = 1,
[
N∑
n=1
(
pn − 1
N
)2] 12
≤ b
 . (3)
Here, the set P(b) captures the ambiguity of the decision-maker’s aggregation scheme in a parsi-
monious parametric manner; as such, we refer to parameter b as aggregation ambiguity.8 It can be
naturally interpreted as setting a bound on the total weight that can be assigned to any group of
experts (see following discussion on page 10). Guaranteeing a bound of this sort may be a norma-
tive or operational desideratum, in the sense that it provides a check on the influence of any single
group of experts, and guards against outlier opinions. Letting eN denote a unit vector of dimension
N , we see that distributions p belonging to P(b) satisfy
∣∣|p − eNN ∣∣|2 ≤ b, where || · ||2 denotes the
Euclidean norm. Setting b = 0 implies the unique consideration of equal second-order probabilities,
while b =
√
N−1
N consideration of the entire simplex ∆
N−1 =
{
p ∈ <N : p ≥ 0, ∑Nn=1 pn = 1}.9
8Note that, despite the term “ambiguity”, the parameter b does not characterize a state or amount of knowledge.
Knowledge, as represented by the set of experts’ pdfs, remains fixed.
9The latter statement holds in light of the fact that values of b >
q
N−1
N
cannot enlarge the feasible set. This is
because the maximizers of
hPN
n=1
`
pn − 1N
´2i 12
over the set of probability vectors concentrate all probability mass
on one expert, leading to an aggregation ambiguity of
h`
1− 1
N
´2
+ (N − 1) · ` 1
N
´2i 12
=
q
N−1
N
.
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Fixing a level of R&D r and weighting the expert pdfs (1) under all linear aggregation schemes
belonging in P(b) induces the following set of probability distributions
Π(b, r) =
{
N∑
n=1
pnpin(·|r) : p ∈ P(b)
}
, (4)
governing the future cost of the technology, conditional on R&D investment r. Thus, the set of
distributions Π(b, r) is identical to the set of mixtures of {pi1(·|r), pi2(·|r), ..., piN (·|r)}, where the
weights of the mixture distributions are constrained to lie in set P(b). Consequently, holding r
fixed, an increase in b implies an expansion of the set of priors a decision maker is willing to
consider.10
Now, define the real-valued function
u (c, r) : C ×R 7→ <,
as representing the utility of R&D investment r, under cost realization c. Given choices for r and
b, we can calculate the best- and worst-case expected utilities associated with r, given the set of
induced prior distributions Π(b, r). This provides a measure of the spread between the worst- and
best-cases, given a “willingness” to stray from the benchmark equal-weight distribution (2) that is
constrained by an aggregation ambiguity of b. More formally, we consider the functions
Vmin(r|b) = min
pi∈Π(b,r)
∫
C
u (c, r) dpi(c) (5)
Vmax(r|b) = max
pi∈Π(b,r)
∫
C
u (c, r) dpi(c). (6)
Plotting functions (5) and (6) over b ∈ [0,√(N − 1)/N ] gives decision makers a comprehensive
picture of the expected payoff of R&D investment r.
10It is important to note that the parameterization (4) may, in some cases, obscure important information. For
instance, suppose one wishes to make a decision on the basis of a water container’s temperature. There are two
experts, one of which provides a pdf suggesting that the water is freezing and the other that it is boiling hot.
Suppose, further, that we know that one of the two experts must be correct. Then it is clear that if we consider the
set of pdfs (4) for some small value of b, we will be taking into account a whole set of pdfs implying that the water is
tepid and none that it is either freezing or boiling. Clearly, in such cases, our framework will likely lead to suboptimal
decisions. To avoid this from happening, we should either (a) set b ≈
q
1
2
that allows for the unmixed consideration
of both expert pdfs, or (b) consider a different parametric framework altogether. We thank an anonymous referee for
bringing this issue to our attention.
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Thus, given a level of aggregation ambiguity b, the functions (5)-(6) focus on the worst- and
best-case expected utility associated with an investment r. As such they capture extreme attitudes
towards uncertainty in expert aggregation. To express more nuanced decision-maker preferences
we consider the following value function
V (r|b, α) = α · Vmin(r|b) + (1− α) · Vmax(r|b) α ∈ [0, 1], (7)
representing a convex combination of the worst- and best-case expected utility. The parameter α
above captures the decision maker’s ambiguity attitude. It measures her degree of pessimism given
aggregation ambiguity b: the greater (smaller) α is, the more (less) weight is placed on the worst-
case scenario. In Section 3, we explain more formally the sense in which parameter α captures the
decision maker’s attitude towards ambiguity.
As mentioned in the introduction, Eq. (7) is a variation of the well-studied α-maxmin model in
decision theory. Given values for b and α, Eq. (7) operates as an objective function when searching
for optimal R&D investment r.
What do different choices of b imply? We offer some brief remarks on the interpretation
of different levels of aggregation ambiguity b. Consider the benchmark equal-weight aggregation
1
N eN . Now take any subset of experts N̂ of cardinality N̂ and begin increasing the collective
second-order probability attached to their pdfs. The convex structure of the feasible set P(b)
enables us to provide a tight upper bound on the maximum total second-order probability that can
be placed on this set of experts, as a function of b and N̂ (we denote
∣∣∣N̂ ∣∣∣ = N̂):
max
p∈P(b)
∑
n∈ bN
pn = min
N̂N + bN̂
√
N − N̂
N̂N
, 1
 . (8)
Extending this logic to any subset of experts, we have the following holding:
p ∈ P(b) ⇔
p ≥ 0,
N∑
n=1
pn = 1,
∑
n∈ bN
pn ≤ min
N̂N + bN̂
√
N − N̂
N̂N
, 1
 , for all N̂ ⊆ N
 .
(9)
Figure 1 provides a graphical visualization of the above algebraic arguments for the case of
N = 3 experts. Consider two levels of aggregation ambiguity b1 and b2. Assume that b1 is such
that 23 + b1 ∗ 2
√
3−2
2∗3 < 1⇔ b1 <
√
1
6 . In this case, by Eq. (8) we know that no pair of experts can
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b1 
b2 
(1/3,1/3,1/3) 
(1,0,0) 
(0,0,1) 
(0,1,0) 
p1 
p2 
p3 
P(b1) 
P(b2) 
Figure 1: The set P(b) for N = 3 and two levels of aggregation ambiguity b1 <
√
1
6 < b2 <
√
2
3 . P(b1) is
the inner circle of radius b1, while P(b2) is the oval-shaped triangular figure subsuming P(b1).
be assigned weight of 1, implying that all experts must be assigned positive weight. Hence, the set
P(b1) is just a circle of radius b1 that is embedded in the simplex ∆2 and centered at the equal-
weight benchmark (1/3,1/3,1/3). This circle does not touch the simplex’s boundary. Conversely,
when b = b2 such that b2 >
√
1
6 and
1
3 + b2
√
3−1
1∗3 < 1⇔ b2 <
√
2
3 , the decision maker (a) allows for
a weight of 1 to be placed on sets of pairs of experts (and thus 0 for sets of single experts), while
(b) setting an upper bound of 13 + b2
√
2
3 < 1 on the weight than a single expert can receive. In this
case, the set P(b2) has a triangular oval-like shape, with parts of it intersecting the boundary of
∆2. Moreover, the closer b2 is to
√
2
3 , the closer the curved segments of P(b2) are to becoming two
intersecting straight lines. When b =
√
2
3 , this transformation is complete and we have P(b) = ∆
2.
On a final note we recognize that, when applying the framework of Eq. (7), there may not be
one single objectively “correct” value for b and α. Thus, we believe it is preferable to examine
Eq. (7) over a reasonable range of b (guided by the insights of Eq. (9)) and α, that is deemed
appropriate for the context at hand. Such an investigation will allow the decision maker to explore
the implications of different (b, α)-combinations in a systematic fashion, and ultimately arrive at a
11
choice of r that she considers justified.11
3 Decision-theoretic foundations
In this section we provide an exposition of the axiomatic underpinnings of the decision-theoretic
model we adopt in Eq. (7). In doing so, we use the analytic framework of Olszewski [37], which
is the most appropriate for our context. Olszewski axiomatized a version of the α-maxmin model
in a setting in which decision makers are called to choose between sets of lotteries, i.e., probability
distributions over outcomes. This fits our R&D setting since, in our model, levels of R&D directly
affect experts’ probability distributions, as per Eq. (1), and thus can be seen as defining a set of
lotteries over the technology’s future payoff.
Readers familiar with models of ambiguity aversion may wonder why we do not draw on
Ghirardato et al. [20] to discuss the axiomatic foundations of our α-maxmin model. More broadly,
they might also ask why we do not adopt different models of ambiguity aversion such as the smooth
ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al. [24]. The short answer to these questions is that the endogeneity
of expert probabilities of Eq. (1) distinguishes our framework from the decision-theoretic setting
of Savage [40], on which the previous contributions are grounded. In particular, the preferences
analyzed in [20, 24] operate in settings where ambiguous probabilistic information is independent
of a decision maker’s actions, and are thus not directly applicable to our context.12
To further highlight the above point, it is instructive to compare our setting to that of Millner
et al. [30]. The starting point of Millner et al.’s analysis is that different climate models (repre-
senting different “expert” groups of climate scientists) provide widely divergent estimates of the
probability distribution of climate sensitivity, a key physical parameter linking greenhouse gases
and temperature increase (see Meinshausen et al. [28]). The scientific community has not reached
an agreement on how best to aggregate these divergent estimates and arrive to a single pdf of
climate sensitivity. Acknowledging this lack of scientific consensus on the “correct” pdf of climate
sensitivity, Millner et al. [30] adopted the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al. [24] to study
optimal abatement policy. However, a key aspect of their modeling framework is that nothing a
11The empirical example of Section 4 (especially Figure 4) suggests the logic of such an exercise.
12On a related note, the theoretical machinery of the Savage framework (involving state spaces, consequence spaces,
and acts) seems overwrought for our context (to this effect, see also the discussion in the introduction of Ahn [1]).
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decision maker does can alter ambiguous scientific information; no decision on abatement can affect
scientists’ probabilistic estimates of climate sensitivity. Climate sensitivity is a physical quantity
that is simply unaffected by human action. This is clearly in contrast to the setting of the present
paper in which decisions on R&D investment do affect experts’ probabilistic estimates on the future
cost of the green technology via Eq. (1).
In what follows, we adopt the notational conventions of Olszewski [37]. SupposeX = {x1, x2, ..., xn}
is a finite set of outcomes, and let ∆ = ∆(X) be the set of all lotteries (i.e., probability distri-
butions) on X. Moreover, let A denote the set of all closed and non-empty subsets of ∆. Given
a utility function u : X 7→ < and a lottery l = (q1, q2, ..., qn), where qi denotes the probability of
outcome xi, let
U(l) =
n∑
i=1
qiu(xi)
denote the expected utility of the lottery l. Consider now a complete and transitive preference
relation  over A. For the rest of this chapter the following assumption is assumed to hold.
Assumption 1 The preferences  restricted to single lotteries admit an expected utility represen-
tation. That is, there exists a utility function u : X 7→ < such that for any two lotteries l1, l2 ∈ ∆,
l1  l2 ⇔ U(l1) ≤ U(l2).
As usual, the utility function u captures the decision maker’s attitude towards risk in an
expected utility framework. Now, consider the α-maxmin rule
Hu,α(A) = α
(
min
l∈A
U(l)
)
+ (1− α)
(
max
l∈A
U(l)
)
, (10)
where α ∈ [0, 1], and define the corresponding preferences Hu,α on A, whereby
A1 Hu,α A2 ⇔ Hu,α(A1) ≤ Hu,α(A2).
Evidently, the value function we consider in Eq. (7) reduces to a special case of the preferences
defined in Eq. (10). We briefly explain how. In the setting of Section 2, the relevant outcome space
equals the cross product of the cost and R&D domains, i.e. C × R. For an expert n, a choice of
r can be viewed as defining a pdf pin on C × R, such that pin(·, r) ≡ pin(·|r) (where the latter is
given by Eq. 1) and pin(·, r˜) ≡ 0 for all r˜ 6= r.13 Consequently, given a (fixed) value of aggregation
13Note that the presence of r as an argument of utility function u compels us to consider this broader outcome
space (instead of just C) and somewhat awkward reframing of pdfs pin, even though there is no direct randomness
associated with r (once the decision maker chooses it, it is fixed).
13
ambiguity b, choosing a value of r is equivalent to choosing a set of lotteries Π(b, r) ∈ A, over which
the minimum and maximum expected utilities will be computed.
Olszewski’s article performed a rigorous and comprehensive theoretical analysis of preferences
Hu,α . In what follows we selectively present what is necessary for our purposes. We are primarily
interested in shedding light on two main issues: (i) the axiomatic foundations of rule Hu,α(A), and
(ii) the interpretation of comparative attitudes towards ambiguity.
Axiom 1 [Set S-Solvability]. For all triplets of sets A,A1, A2 such that one of the sets A1, A2
is a singleton, if A1  A  A2, then there exists a p ∈ [0, 1] such that A ∼ pA1 + (1− p)A2.
As we can see, Set S-Solvability operates as an analog of the intermediate value theorem of calculus
on preferences over sets of lotteries. As such, it imposes a sort of continuity property on preferences
so that no “jumps” are allowed.
A stronger, and more mathematically involved, version of preference continuity is given by the
following axiom.
Axiom 2 [Set Continuity]. For every set of lotteries A1, sets {A2 : A2 ≺ A1} and {A2 : A1 ≺
A2} are open in the space of all closed subsets of ∆ equipped with the Hausdorff distance.14
Set Continuity implies Set S-Solvability, and generalizes the traditional notion of continuity to sets
of lotteries. Among its consequences is the fact that a decision-maker will be indifferent between a
set of lotteries A and A∪ l, where l 6∈ A is a “middle-of-the-line” lottery that we know will never be
among the argmins or the argmaxs in Eq. (10). This is a strong, and not uncontroversial, axiom.
See Chapter 4 in Olszewski [37] for more information on how Set Continuity may, in some cases,
be violated by decision makers.
Axiom 3 [Set S-Independence]. If A1  A2 and l is a single lottery, then pA1 + (1 − p)l 
pA2 + (1− p)l for all p ∈ [0, 1].
14Skipping some of the formal details, the Hausdorff distance of two lotteries A and B is given by
dH(A,B) = max

max
a∈A
min
b∈B
d(a, b),max
b∈B
min
a∈A
d(a, b)
ff
.
14
Set S-Independence generalizes the traditional notion of weak independence for single lotteries.
Essentially, what it says is that the decision maker’s preferences over two sets A1 and A2 cannot
be reversed by randomizing over these sets and a single lottery l.
Axiom 4 [Disjoint Set Betweeness (DSB)]
(a) For any disjoint sets A1 and A2, if A1  A2, then A1  A1 ∪A2  A2.
(b) If l1 ≺ l2 for all l1 ∈ A1 and l2 ∈ A2, then A1 ≺ A1 ∪A2 ≺ A2.
Part (a) of DSB captures what seems like an intuitive property: if two sets of lotteries A1 and A2 are
disjoint and A2 is preferred to A1, then their union, in terms of the decision maker’s preferences,
will lie somewhere inbetween A1 and A2. That is, one cannot gain by incorporating the “bad”
lotteries of A1 to A2, in the same way as one cannot lose by incorporating the “good” lotteries of
A2 to A1. Part (b) restates (a) for the case of disjoint sets of lotteries in which the lotteries of one
set uniformly dominate the lotteries of the other.
Theorem 1 (Olszewski [37]) A preference  defined on A satisfies Set Continuity, Set S-Independence,
and DSB if and only if there exists a unique α ∈ (0, 1) such that
 = Hu,α .
The parameter α is unaltered under positive affine transformations of u. As a corollary, preferences
Hu,α satisfy Set S-Solvability, Set S-Independence, and DSB for any α ∈ (0, 1).
Having presented the characterization result of Theorem 1, we now discuss comparative atti-
tudes towards ambiguity. Given preferences 1 and 2, let B be a set of lotteries such that 1
and 2 coincide on single lotteries from the set B. Then B is called congruent with respect to
preferences 1 and 2. More formally, B is congruent with respect to 1 and 2 if for all l1, l2 ∈ B,
l1 1 l2 ⇔ l1 2 l2.
Definition 1 Consider two preferences 1 and 2. If, for any congruent set B,
B 2 A⇒ B 1 A and B ≺2 A⇒ B ≺1 A,
for all A ⊂ B, then a decision maker with preferences 1 is more ambiguity averse than one with
2.
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The intuition behind the above definition is the following. Preferences 1 are more ambiguity
averse than 2 if, given any congruent set B, whenever 2 prefers a set of lotteries A to its bigger
superset B ⊃ A, then so does 1 (while the other side of the relation may not always be true). This
definition of relative ambiguity aversion is reminiscent of similar concepts in the literature of risk
aversion (see, e.g., Yaari [48]). It leads to the following corollary, which identifies α as a measure
of comparative ambiguity aversion.
Corollary 1 Suppose that 1 and 2 defined on A satisfy Set Continuity, Set S-Independence,
and DSB. Then preferences 1 are more ambiguity averse than 2 if and only if α1 ≥ α2.
In closing this Section, we wish to note that Olszewski proved a variant of Theorem 1 and
Corollary 1 for the restricted domain of convex polyhedral lotteries. This alternative characteriza-
tion uses a different set of axioms (e.g., replacing Set Continuity), which may be useful for future
analyses focusing on convex-polyhedral sets of lotteries.
4 Empirical application to solar-technology R&D
We base the empirical application of our model on original data collected by the ICARUS survey,
an expert elicitation on the potential of solar technologies. During the course of 2010-2011, the
ICARUS survey collected expert judgments on future costs and technological barriers of different
Photovoltaic (PV) and Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) technologies.15 Sixteen leading European
experts from academia, the private sector, and international institutions took part in the survey.
The elicitation collected probabilistic information on (1) the year-2030 expected cost of the tech-
nologies; (2) the role of public European Union R&D investments in affecting those costs; and (3)
the potential for the deployment of these technologies (both in OECD and non-OECD countries).
We refer readers interested in the general findings of the survey to Bosetti et al. [10] and we focus
here on the data on future costs as they form the basis of our analysis.
Current 5-year EU R&D investment in solar technology is estimated at 165 million US dollars.
The ICARUS study elicited the probabilistic estimates of the 16 experts on the 2030 solar electricity
15The survey is part of a 3-year ERC-funded project on innovation in carbon-free technologies (ICARUS - Innovation
for Climate chAnge mitigation: a study of energy R&D, its Uncertain effectiveness and Spillovers www.icarus-
project.org).
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cost (2005 c$/kWh) under three future Scenarios: (1) keeping current levels of R&D constant until
2030, (2) increasing them by 50%, and (3) increasing them by 100%. Coherent responses were
obtained from 14 out of the 16 experts so the analysis that follows focuses solely on them.16 We used
linear interpolation of the survey’s collected data (generally 3-6 points of each expert’s cumulative
distribution function(cdf) conditional on R&D investment) to compute a pdf for each expert n ∈
{1, 2, ..., 14}, given the three relevant levels of R&D investment denoted by r ∈ {r1, r2, r3} (here
ri refers to Scenario i).17 These pdfs represent experts’ subjective probability distributions of the
cost of technology as denoted in Eq. (1). Figure 3 plots the corresponding cdfs as well as the cdf
that the aggregate pdf (2) leads to, under all three Scenarios.
[FIGURE 2 here]
As one can see in Figure 2 there is considerable disagreement between experts over the potential
of solar technology. This disagreement is particularly acute under Scenario 1, and diminishes
as R&D levels increase. Nonetheless, the breakthrough nature of innovation and the need to
cross certain firm cost thresholds, means that ambiguity in expert estimates remains an important
concern, even under Scenario 3. This will become apparent in the analysis to follow.
We measure the utility of an investment via its net payoff. Denoting the benefit associated to
a technology cost c by the function B(c) and the opportunity cost of an investment r by O(r), this
is given by the following utility function:
u(c, r) = B(c)−O(r). (11)
The next section describes how we provide numerical values for B(·) and O(·).
Quantifying benefits and opportunity costs of solar technology R&D. Expected benefits
of solar technology R&D investments are quantified via a general equilibrium intertemporal model
16By “coherent” we mean non-contradictory responses which do not violate the laws of probability. In particular,
2 out of the 16 elicited experts provided probabilistic estimates implying non-monotonic cumulative distribution
functions, which is clearly in conflict with probability theory and thus unusable for our purposes. As mentioned in
the introduction, such incoherent expert estimates have been discussed in the literature (Millner et al. [29], Kriegler
et al. [26]), and addressing them in the context of expert elicitations is deserving of further study.
17Please refer to the Appendix for more information on how expert pdfs were constructed from the ICARUS survey
data.
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(Bosetti et al. [9]) that can account for a range of macro-economic feedbacks and interactions. These
include the effects of energy and climate change policies, the competition for innovation resources
with other power technologies, the effect of growth, as well as a number of other factors.18 To
capture the long-term nature of such investments, the integrated assessment model is run over
the time horizon 2005-2100 in 5-year time periods for the whole range of exogenously-imposed
possible 2030-costs of solar power that we are considering. Subsequently, simulation results are
compared to the benchmark case in which the cost of solar power is so high that the technology is
not competitive with alternative production modes. For each possible 2030 solar-power cost, the
benefit to the European Union is quantified by the discounted EU-consumption improvement over
the entire time-horizon 2005-2100 with respect to the case where solar technology is not competitive.
Table 1 summarizes the results.
[TABLE 1 here]
Three important assumptions are at the basis of the numbers reported in Table 2. First, as the
survey concentrated on public EU R&D investment and the effects of increasing it, we disregard
spillovers and technological transfers to the rest of the world and consider only the consumption
improvement for Europe. Second, we evaluate the benefit of alternative 2030 costs of solar power
assuming that no carbon policy is in place and that no special constraints on other technologies
are imposed (e.g., a partial ban on nuclear technology). Third, we discount cash flows using a 3%
discount rate. Although our choice is well in the range of discount rates adopted for large scale
public projects, it is important to note that the cost threshold for positive payoffs is robust for
a wide range of more myopic discount rate values. Our assumptions all err on the side of being
conservative about the potential payoffs of solar-technology R&D.
We now explain how we calculate the costs of solar R&D investment. Given an R&D investment
r, we assume that actual R&D spending is fixed at r during the period 2005-2030, in line with the
survey questions. After 2030 we assume that spending drops to half its initial value, i.e. r/2,
and remains at that level until 2100. This drop occurs because we assume that post-2030 funds
represent the government’s commitment to maintain the technological gains achieved by 2030. We
18The analysis is carried out using the World Induced Technical Change Hybrid (WITCH) model (Bosetti et al. [9]),
an energy-economy-climate model that has been used extensively for economic analysis of climate change policies.
See www.witchmodel.org for a list of applications and papers.
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now derive the discounted opportunity cost of such expenditure streams of solar-technology R&D
spending. In doing so we follow Popp [38] and assume that, at every time period, this opportunity
cost is equal to 4 times the original investment. Thus, in our model the opportunity cost of a level
of R&D investment r is given by the net present value of the stream O(t) where O(t) = 4 · r for
t = 1, 2, ..., 6 and 2 ·r for t = 7, 8, ..., 20 (once again we use a 3% discount rate). Table 2 summarizes
these results for the three R&D Scenarios that the ICARUS survey focused on.
[TABLE 2 here]
Application of the decision-theoretic framework. We now extend our analysis to explicitly
account for aggregation ambiguity and adopt the decision-theoretic model introduced in Section
3.19 Our objective is to compare the three R&D Scenarios, and we do not consider optimizing
over a wider R&D domain R. We make this choice primarily because we wish to keep the applied
section brief and pursue more in-depth empirical analysis in future work.20
Figure 3 plots Vmax (r|b) and Vmin (r|b) over b ∈
[
0,
√
13
14
]
≈ [0, .96] for the three Scenarios.
[FIGURE 3 here]
Focusing first on Scenario 1, we note that equal-weight aggregation of expert opinion (corre-
sponding to b = 0) yields an expected payoff of approximately $1.36 × 109. We observe that the
worst-case expected payoff drops to about $ − 3.4 × 109 at b ≈ .25 at which point it largely stops
being sensitive to changes in b, slowly asymptoting to its minimum value of $− 3.67× 109; in con-
trast, the best-case one increases steadily to a maximum value of $22.7×109 at the maximum level
of b = .96. Under Scenario 2, the expected payoff for b = 0 is equal to $7.8 × 109. Subsequently,
we see that the worst-case payoff drops to 0 at b = 0.15, at which point it keeps decreasing at a
smaller rate until it practically reaches its minimum value of $− 5.5× 109 at b ≈ .55. Conversely,
the best-case payoff rises steadily to about $32 × 109 for b ≈ .55 at which point it continues to
19All simulations are performed in Mathematica. The optimizations are facilitated by the fact that right-
hand-side of Eqs. (5) and (6) can be rewritten as Vmin(r|b) = minp∈P(b)
PN
n=1 pnun(r) and Vmax(r|b) =
maxp∈P(b)
PN
n=1 pnun(r), where un(r) ≡
R
C u(c, r)dpin(c|r). These equalities are valid by the linearity of the ex-
pectation operator under mixtures of distributions.
20Indeed, constructing plausible approximations of experts’ un(r) functions over an interesting range of r will likely
require further engagement with the experts.
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rise at a much smaller rate until it reaches a maximum value of $33.3 × 109 at b = .96. Thus for
Scenario 2, aggregation uncertainty becomes largely unimportant once b reaches the threshold of
0.55. Under Scenario 3 the unambiguous payoff is around $20× 109, significantly higher than both
other Scenarios. The worst-case expected payoff drops relatively smoothly to a minimum value of
$−7.35×109 for b = .96, while the best-case one rises at a comparatively higher rate to $70.9×109.
It is clear that aggregation ambiguity is important under Scenario 3, for both the worst-
and best-case expected payoffs, resulting in a wider spread than Scenarios 1 and 2. This fact is
interesting in light of Figure 2, which shows that experts’ pdfs are much more dispersed under
Scenarios 1 and 2 than they are under 3. The reason behind this seemingly unexpected result is
straightforward. As Table 2 suggests, expected payoffs of R&D investment are very sensitive at low
cost values, i.e., less than 8c$/kWh. The more aggressive investment of Scenario 3 has a greater
effect on these lower cost values, and therefore its best- and worst-case payoffs are in turn more
sensitive to changes in b.
Figure 4 goes a step further and compares the three R&D Scenarios for all possible combinations
of b and α. Following the color scheme of Figure 3, a region’s color corresponds to the Scenario
that performs the best within it, while the bold numbers within regions denote the ranking of the
three Scenarios within this range of (b, α) (e.g., an expression “321” means Scenario 2 dominates
1, and Scenario 3 dominates both 2 and 1).
[FIGURE 4 here]
Figure 4 makes clear that Scenario 3 dominates 1 and 2 for an extremely wide range of com-
binations of b and α. Conversely, Scenario 1 is the best option for a combination of very high b
and α. Somewhat surprisingly, we see that Scenario 2 is dominated by either 1 or 3 for all possible
combinations of b and α and thus will never be chosen by a decision maker whose preferences
are captured by Eq. (7). Thus, on the basis of the presented data, it is clear that policy makers
should opt for the most aggressive R&D investment, unless they are both (a) open to ignoring
a very large set of surveyed experts (b) extremely concerned about the possibility of worst-case
failure. Moreover, assuming all three options are readily implementable, they can safely disregard
the middle-range R&D investment implied by Scenario 2.
We end this section by noting that the result of Figure 4 is quite robust to the application of
the model to different subsets of experts. This is due to, in large part, the fact that a significant
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majority of experts agree that doubling current R&D has a good chance of pushing the cost of
solar below 7.5, which, according to WITCH and our assumption regarding opportunity costs, is
the threshold point for large gains to be realized. That being said, it also should be mentioned that
the views of Experts 4, 6, and 9, are at complete odds with this picture, so that applying the model
on their pdfs alone results in completely different ranking of the three scenarios in (b, α)-space. In
particular, Scenario 2 predominantly dominates 1 and 3, and where that is not the case Scenario 1
is preferred (Scenario 3 is dominated everywhere by either 1 or 2). This suggests that the pattern of
Figure 4 is not solely driven by assumptions embedded into the WITCH model and the calculation
of opportunity costs.
5 Conclusions
Expert elicitation studies can play an important role in informing environmental policy. If designed
well, they may be able to capture in a transparent and objective way subjective probabilities that
can subsequently be used as scientific data in the decision maker’s deliberations.
When there is significant variation in expert estimates, condensing all of the problem’s uncer-
tainty into a single probability distribution reflecting equal weights across experts may yield policy
recommendations that are not robust, especially when the issue on which expert opinion is sought
is unprecedented or highly complex. To address such concerns, we proposed and analyzed a variant
of the well-studied α-maxmin model due to Olszewski [37]. In line with the paper’s focus on R&D
investment, decision variables in our model affect experts’ subjective probability distributions of
the future cost-effectiveness of an investment. We applied our framework to original data from a
recent expert elicitation survey on solar technology. The analysis suggested that more aggressive
investment in solar technology R&D is likely to yield substantial benefits even after ambiguity over
expert opinion has been taken into account.
It should be mentioned that our work, while formally rooted in the literature of decision making
under ambiguity, may also be interpreted as a structured form of sensitivity analysis in a purely
Bayesian setting. Thus, it may be of interest also to scholars who are skeptical of models of
ambiguity aversion as a foundation of rational decision making.
Our work suggests several fruitful avenues for future research. A particularly challenging one
would be to extend the α-maxmin model to take into account higher moments or quantiles (see,
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e.g., the quantile-based decision-theoretic framework of Rostek [39]) of the considered mixture
distributions of Eq. (4). This change would introduce nonlinearities that significantly complicate
the analysis, both theoretically and computationally. Alternatively, we could consider making
expert weights quantile-specific, to reflect varying degrees of decision-maker confidence across the
domain of expert distributions. For instance, a decision maker may trust some experts more on the
probability of tail events, while others more on the probability of typical events, depending on their
experience.21 On the applied front, extensions of this work could delve deeper into the ICARUS
survey data to obtain more data points and ultimately solve for optimal R&D investment over a
broader domain.
Appendix
A1: Constructing expert pdfs for the three R&D Scenarios from ICARUS survey
data
In the ICARUS survey, experts were asked to provide values for the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile
of their distributions for the 2030 cost of solar technology conditional on all three Scenarios. In
addition, they were asked to provide values for the probability of this cost being less than or equal
to the following three values: 11.3, 5.5, and 3c$/kWh. These “threshold” cost levels correspond to
projections of the costs of electricity from fossil fuels or nuclear in 2030. The first (11.27 c$/kWh)
corresponds to the 2030 projected cost of electricity from traditional coal power plants in the
presence of a specific policy to control CO2 emissions (thus effectively doubling electricity costs
from fossil sources). The second threshold cost (5.5 c$/kWh) is the projected cost of electricity
from traditional fossil fuels in 2030, without considering any carbon tax. Finally, the third (3
c$/kWh) reflects a situation in which solar power becomes competitive with the levelized cost of
electricity from nuclear power.
Asking experts the follow up question on the likelihood of reaching threshold cost targets
allowed the survey authors to guard against the cognitive pitfalls associated with direct elicitation of
subjective probabilities, to increase the amount of elicited information, and to deepen the discussion
with the expert, hence improving their perception of his/her beliefs. In cases where the two sets of
21We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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answers (percentile values and threshold probabilities) were inconsistent, we contacted the expert
in order to obtain coherent estimates. Moreover, we asked all experts to give values for the upper
and lower limits of their distribution’s support in order to pinpoint the intervals over which their
implied probability distributions range.
Such corrected estimates were obtained from 14 out of the original 16 experts, and therefore
the analysis of Section 4 focuses solely on them. Among the respondents, not all provided values on
the left and right endpoints of their distributions’ support. As a result, we deduced between 6 and 8
points of 14 experts’ cumulative distribution functions (cdf) of the 2030 cost of solar electricity, given
the aforementioned three R&D investment Scenarios. From these points a probability distribution
function (pdf) was constructed using linear interpolation in the following way. First of all, and in
accordance with the experts’ answers, we considered cost levels c lying in [2c$/kWh, 30c$/kWh]
and discretized this interval on a scale of 0.5 (30c$/kWh represents an estimate of the technology’s
current cost). Now, suppose an expert reported the values of his/her cdf Fn at two successive
points c1 and c2 where c2 > c1 and gave no further information on cost levels between c1 and c2.
Assuming right-continuity of Fn we took the probability mass Fn(c2) − Fn(c1) to be distributed
uniformly among the cost levels {c1 + .5, c1 + 1, ..., c2}. For experts who did not provide values for
the lower limit of their distribution’s support we assumed that whatever probability mass remained
to be allocated (always less than .1) was distributed uniformly between the smallest argument of
the cdf and two cost levels below it. For example, if an expert only indicated that cl was his y’th
percentile and gave no further points of the cdf below this, we assumed that a probability mass
of y was distributed evenly across {cl − 1, cl − .5, cl}. In the case of an unknown upper limit, if
an expert only indicated that cu was his yth percentile and gave no further arguments for the cdf
above it, we assumed that a probability mass of 1−y was distributed evenly across {cu+ .5, cu+1}.
Following this procedure we arrived at probability distribution functions for all 14 experts
conditional on all three Scenarios. The implied cumulative distribution functions are depicted in
Figure 3.
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A3: Tables and Figures not in main text
2030 solar-technology cost c Benefit B(c)
(2005 USc$/kWh) (US$ 109)
2 189.90
2.5 170.76
3 151.26
3.5 131.74
4 112.12
4.5 92.29
5 71.47
5.5 50.64
6 29.27
6.5 23.59
7 12.32
7.5 3.67
8 1.76
> 8 0
Table 1: EU discounted consumption improvement as a function of 2030 solar-power cost
R&D Scenario r Opportunity Cost O(r) (US$ 109)
r1 3.67
r2 5.51
r3 7.35
Table 2: Discounted opportunity cost of R&D Scenarios
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Figure 2: Expert and aggregate cdfs of the 2030 cost of solar technology conditional on the three
R&D Scenarios. Recall that the cdf’s domain is {2, 2.5, ..., 29, 29.5, 30}. Cost is measured in 2005
USc$/kWh.
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Figure 3: Worst and Best-Case net payoffs (benefits minus opportunity cost) for the three R&D
scenarios. Net payoffs are measured in US$109.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the three R&D scenarios over all values of b and α.
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